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INTRODUCTION 
During “Superstorm” Sandy in 2012, New York University’s 
Langone Medical Center lost power when its auxiliary generator 
malfunctioned.1  At the height of the hurricane emergency, hospital 
staff sprang into action.  In some cases, the staff hand-pumped oxygen 
into patients until they could be transported by ambulance to other 
facilities.2  Ultimately, all 215 patients were evacuated from the 
hospital.3  After the storm subsided, questions lingered about why 
Langone’s back-up generators failed to function properly.4  Ensuring 
that generators work is, after all, a safety best practice and a key 
element of disaster preparation for hospitals.5 
Failing to have a reliable backup power source for a medical 
facility responsible for the care of critically ill patients is an example 
of a design flaw: a mistake or weakness in the way something or some 
process was designed.  The generators at Langone were a single point 
of failure — a non-redundant part of a system whose failure will cause 
the entire system to shut down.6 
This Article contends there is a design flaw in our current 
democratic system that similarly contains too few fail-safes and 
undermines a critical aspect of our policymaking infrastructure, i.e. 
the resources, personnel, and authority to enforce the laws we have 
passed as a polity.  Like a hospital without a generator, an airplane 
with only one engine, an IT system with compromised critical 
hardware, or a large city with only one two-lane road out of town, 
 
 1. Alexandra Sifferlin, Lessons from Storm Sandy: When Hospital Generators 
Fail, TIME (Oct. 30, 2012) http://healthland.time.com/2012/10/30/lessons-from-storm-
sandy-when-hospital-generators-fail/ [https://perma.cc/BNW2-2HHB]. 
 2. Charles Ornstein, Why Do Hospital Generators Keep Failing?, PROPUBLICA 
(Oct. 31, 2012, 4:53 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-do-hospitals-
generators-keep-failing [https://perma.cc/A4D7-BQ69]. 
 3. J. David Goodman & Colin Moynihan, Patients Evacuated from NYU 
Langone After Power Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/nyregion/patients-evacuated-from-nyu-langone-
after-power-failure.html [https://nyti.ms/2yWnTAR]. 
 4. Id.; see also What Caused Generators to Fail at NYC Hospitals, CBS/AP 
(Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-caused-generators-to-fail-at-nyc-
hospitals/ [https://perma.cc/4KXZ-P3YX]. 
 5. Sifferlin, supra note 1.  Jim Mandler, Assistant Vice President for Public 
Affairs of Continnum Health Partners, commented on the Hurricane Sandy response, 
saying, “Whenever there is an anticipated event, even if remote, we always make sure 
the generators are fully fueled and ready to go for at least several days.” Id. 
 6. Steven Vigeant, How to Find (and Eliminate) Single Points of Failure, DATA 
EVOLUTION’S IT EXPERTS BLOG (May 22, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www.dataev.com/it-
experts-blog/how-to-find-and-eliminate-single-points-of-failure 
[https://perma.cc/XY4Q-QESP]. 
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concentrating the infrastructure for enforcing our rights in one level 
of government leaves residents vulnerable to underenforcement when 
extralegal forces — elections, budgetary challenges, and competing 
priorities — reduce the function of that governmental body. 
Much of the scholarship on the role of cities begins, as one might 
expect, by looking at municipalities themselves.7  The existing 
scholarship analyzes the unique powers of municipalities, the legal 
limitations of city authority, and the comparative role of cities in our 
federal system.8  These critical issues are essential to understanding 
 
 7. Throughout this Article, we refer to cities, counties, and municipalities 
interchangeably. 
 8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II – Localism and Legal 
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 354 (1990) (“[M]unicipalities have considerable de 
facto power to frame local policies and pursue local goals.”); David Schleicher, The 
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1547 (2010) 
(contending that a municipal “corporation” possesses three powers: (1) those 
expressly granted to it, (2) those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the 
powers expressly granted, and (3) those essential or indispensable to the purposes of 
the corporation); see also, e.g., Paul Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1121–29 (2012) (discussing the limitations of the subject-based 
private law exception); Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak 
Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 
2545 (2006) (stating cities have limited power in the American political system); Rich 
Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & 
POL. 147, 178 (2005) (“When states and localities disagree, federalism and localism 
are conceptually incompatible, and federalism, more often than not, wins.”).  On 
comparative role of cities in our federal system, see, e.g., Kathleen Morris, The Case 
for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“In 
the period between 1889 and 1900, the Court issued a series of opinions that 
zigzagged between addressing state/local constitutional conflicts on the merits 
without discussing the status of local governments and slowly but surely moving 
towards a comprehensive federal doctrine of local governmental powerlessness.”); 
Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 
1622 (2008) (discussing local governments’ increased interest in affecting immigration 
policy); Nestor Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an 
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2007) (“The prevailing view of 
local government identity in federal law is one of fundamental powerlessness, with 
localities at the whim of states’ plenary authority. In a lesser-recognized tradition, 
however, courts have allowed local governments to invoke federal authority to resist 
assertions of state power.”); Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General 
Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal Consumer Protection 
Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 55–65 (2011) (analyzing federal statutes that 
authorize concurrent state enforcement); Paul Diller, Re-Orienting Home Rule: Part 
I – The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 
1047–48 (2017) (highlighting that “cities are addressing subjects or using modes of 
regulation that are not unique to local government” as a part of their growing 
activism); Heather Gerken & Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009) (discussing the federal government’s dependence on 
local authorities to administer federal programs); David Schleicher, Federalism and 
State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 815 (2016) (“The very things that make 
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the formal power of cities and the relative merits of limitations on 
those powers.  We approach our analysis, however, from a different 
perspective.  We do not start with cities at all.  We begin by focusing 
on a basic, functional question: How do we design an effective system 
that adequately enforces the laws of our democracy, protecting all 
members of our communities?  How can we make the laws developed 
through the legislative process at all levels of government a reality for 
those they were written to protect?  Put another way, how do we fully 
effectuate the democratic process? 
Law is the language society uses to document and communicate the 
rules of our democratic system.  Our laws express our values as a 
community and the will of the People through their representatives.9  
Laws prohibit myriad behaviors that harm our communities and that 
we, as a society, have decided should be impermissible: 
discrimination,10 predatory lending,11 and environmental 
despoliation,12 for example.  Having laws on the books provides a 
deterrent against illegal behavior.  But, prohibitions only go so far.  
Civil law enforcement is essential if our policies are to be a reality for 
the communities they protect.  If the laws passed by our elected 
representatives are legitimate, we should view enforcement as a 
necessary corollary to legislative policymaking to ensure compliance 
with those laws.  Indeed, when our laws go unenforced, our 
democracy cannot function properly. 
In practice, however, our communities do not currently receive the 
full benefit of the laws written to protect them due to at least three 
 
partisan federalism work may prevent smaller national minorities from using local 
power to affect national discussions.”). 
 9. See Yehezkel Dror, Values and the Law, 17 ANTIOCH REV. 440, 440 (1957) 
(“One of the more important repositories and expressions of the values of any society 
is its law . . . These legal norms are closely related to various social values, being 
either direct expression of them or serving them in a more indirect way.”); Philip 
Sales, Judges and the Legislature: Values into Law, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 287, 290 
(2012) (considering the ways in which the legislature and the judiciary give expression 
to political and moral values by noting that “the cardinal [rule] of democracy, of 
course, is that it provides a practical mechanism of control of the rulers by the 
ruled . . . And hence a safeguard against tyranny and arbitrary rule and motive for the 
rulers to seek to promote and respect the interests of the ruled”). 
 10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I–X, XIII–XV, IXX; Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12101–12103 (2009); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (1968). 
 11. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ch. 2 §§ 41–58 (2006); 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 12 CFR 226.32; Truth in Lending Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1968). 
 12. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1977); Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1974). 
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phenomena described in this Article.13  First, our laws are under-
enforced, and this “enforcement gap” means that many legal 
violations go undetected and unaddressed, undermining the force of 
those laws to regulate conduct in the workplace, marketplace, and 
broader community.14  Second, the Trump administration has pulled 
back on its enforcement of key public rights.15  Not only have leaders 
of prominent federal agencies expressed their intention to be less 
aggressive in fulfilling their roles as protectors of civil, economic, and 
environmental rights, but many have articulated and demonstrated an 
outright hostility to those protections.16  Third, the power of private 
 
 13. A full exposition of the legal and political dynamics underpinning these three 
trends is outside the scope of this Article. 
 14. See, e.g., Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and 
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1904–05 (2013); 
see Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake 
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 659–60 (2012) (discussing 
how the erosion of class action certifications and the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau have led to an enforcement gap for consumer protection, antitrust, and 
employment violations that should be addressed by state attorneys general using 
their parens patrie authority); see also Suzette Malveaux, The Modern Class Action 
Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 379–80 
(2017) (noting that increased use of arbitration agreements “does a disservice to 
those individuals seeking to use the civil rights provision of the modern class action 
rule,” leading to “less enforcement in the cases where it is needed the most”). 
 15. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump Is Rolling Back Obama’s 
Legacy, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obama-
rules/?utm_term=.5cc8cde4fb41 [https://perma.cc/Y74H-5VSF] (reporting that, as of 
January 20, 2018, the Trump administration had canceled 130 rules and regulations 
within the topics of the environment, labor and finance, health care, civil rights, 
worker and consumer safety, government reform, immigration, and education); see 
also Juliet Eilperin et al., Trump Administration Plans to Minimize Civil Rights 
Efforts in Agencies, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-
civil-rights-efforts-in-agencies/2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-
ddbb23c75d82_story.html?utm_term=.f51cf022aea2 [https://perma.cc/XYB3-SH2P] 
(discussing the Trump administration’s cuts to staffers of the Education 
Department’s Office of Civil Rights, termination of enforcement of consent decrees 
with police departments, and plan to disband the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs that has monitored discrimination among federal contractors). 
 16. See, e.g., Erica Green, DeVos Education Dept. Begins Dismissing Civil Rights 
Cases in the Name of Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/20/us/politics/devos-education-department-civil-
rights.html [https://nyti.ms/2Hf9jdU] (“The Education Department’s Office for Civil 
Rights has begun dismissing hundreds of civil rights complaints under a new protocol 
that allows investigators to disregard cases that are part of serial filings or that they 
consider burdensome to the office.”); Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney, Consumer 
Bureau’s Chief, Urges Congress to Cripple Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/politics/cfpb-mick-mulvaney.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2Gwm7MI] (“In his first report to Congress as the acting director of 
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litigants to vindicate their own rights in court has been diminished; 
over the past decade, constriction of laws related to class-action 
lawsuits and the increased acceptance of mandatory arbitration 
clauses and class-action waivers have left individuals who experience 
harm in the workplace or at the hands of an unscrupulous company 
without much meaningful recourse.17 
The confluence of these three trends exposes a design flaw in our 
current democratic system.  Laws are under-enforced, and two of the 
actors previously well-situated to enforce the rights enshrined in those 
laws are either inactive or blocked.  As a result, our most vulnerable 
communities are without defenders, the extent of their protections 
drastically cut as a result of one federal election.  This design flaw has 
both functional and theoretical effects.  From a functional 
perspective, it subjects people to real-life harm and loss of wages, 
employment, capital, housing, and other necessities of modern life, 
even when the conduct that caused those losses is contrary to existing 
law.18  From the perspective of democratic theory and norms, it 
undermines the legitimacy of institutions charged with representing 
the will of the People through rule of law when those laws lack real-
life effect. 
This Article argues that a system with built-in redundancy and 
diversification by design, in which every level of government is ready 
and able to enforce our core rights and freedoms, would resolve this 
design flaw and yield both practical and theoretical benefits.  We 
present city affirmative litigation as a critical component of this 
framework.  Our proposed solution to this design flaw would 
incorporate two concepts: redundancy and diversification.  By 
redundancy, we mean that an effective system should have more than 
a single point of failure.  Given the importance of enforcement as a 
means of effectuating duly-enacted policy and fulfilling the 
 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Mick Mulvaney called on lawmakers on 
Monday to cripple the agency that he has been temporarily tasked with overseeing.”); 
Coral Davenport, Scott Pruitt, Under Fire, Plans to Initiate a Big Environmental 
Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/climate/pruitt-clean-air-water-rollbacks.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2HOi2zd] (“Mr. Pruitt has initiated the rollback of dozens of 
environmental rules over the past year and a half.”). 
 17. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 658–60; Malveaux, supra note 14, at 
376–79; see also Joanna Pearl, As SCOTUS Abandons Workers, States, Cities Must 
Fill Void, NAT’L L. J. (June 7, 2018, 3:06 PM), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/07/as-scotus-abandons-workers-
states-cities-must-fill-void/?slreturn=20180624035731 [https://perma.cc/4TJ7-8RVU] 
(discussing the effects of Epic Systems decision on modern employment rights). 
 18. See infra Section I.A. 
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representational values of a democracy, redundancy by design would 
ensure that no one agency or election could offline enforcement 
entirely.  By diversification, we mean that an effective system should 
have a diversified set of enforcers to allow for effective resolution of 
the numerous and complex problems presented by law violations.  
Additionally, because “the People” can mean different things 
depending on a district or state’s boundaries, diversification would 
ensure that different majorities can set different priorities for 
enforcement. 
Increased city engagement in enforcing public rights laws is an 
important and under-utilized solution that incorporates both concepts 
of redundancy and diversification.19  Cities should have the ability to 
be enforcers and protectors of their communities by investigating 
legal violations and filing lawsuits.  Increasing affirmative litigation by 
cities is a necessary and desirable response to a design flaw that 
concentrates too many enforcement resources in one level of 
government. 
Part I describes the three above-listed trends in three sections: Part 
I.A articulates the need for enforcement as a critical step in policy 
making efforts and discusses the gap between the laws on the books 
and the lived realities of many people those laws are written to serve 
(the so-called “enforcement gap”).  Part I.B addresses the role of the 
federal government as a dominant government enforcer of our core 
rights and protections and highlights the ways in which the current 
administration has abdicated that role.  Part I.C outlines the legal 
 
 19. We acknowledge that states also have the ability to enforce laws that protect 
the rights of their communities.  Indeed, many have been and continue to be leaders 
in rights enforcement across a wide variety of issues. Complaint, California v. Heald 
Coll., No. CGC-13-534793 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 10, 2013); Complaint, New York v. 
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 400016/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 14. 2018); Mark L. 
Earley, Special Solicitude: The Growing Power of State Attorneys General, 52 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 561 (2018); Mark Totten, The Rise of State Attorneys General a Boon 
to Democracy, HILL, (July 6, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/state-local-politics/340841-the-rise-of-the-state-attorney-generals-is-boon-to 
[https://perma.cc/QL6K-UVTN]; see generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007); Complaint, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 29, 
2017).  Although a full discussion of the role of states is outside the scope of this 
Article, we believe that state-level engagement — by attorneys general and state 
regulatory bodies, for example — is critical to protecting the rights of our most 
vulnerable communities.  We focus on cities for the purpose of this Article because 
they are under-explored relative to State actors in a system.  As we note infra Part II, 
state attorneys general offer additional opportunities to diversify enforcement from 
the federal government.  We do not argue that cities should supplant states as the 
only or primary enforcer in addition to the federal government.  Rather, we highlight 
cities as an under-utilized opportunity for redundancy and diversification in rights 
enforcement. 
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limitations on private enforcement and the practical impact of Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes20 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion21 and their progeny on rights enforcement.  Part II 
proposes affirmative litigation by cities as one viable solution to the 
confluence of factors operating to weaken protections under the law.  
The concepts of redundancy and diversification offer compelling 
rationales for increased city affirmative litigation as a design solution 
to ensure better effectuation of thePeople’s policy choices through 
their representatives.  Moreover, cities should have an active role in 
rights enforcement at all times, not just in response to the current 
crisis.22 
I.   THE DESIGN FLAW: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL BARRIERS 
TO ENFORCEMENT 
As mentioned above, our current government contains a 
fundamental design flaw where one point of failure exposes the entire 
system and leaves the People vulnerable and defenseless.  This Part 
describes three phenomena that prevents those in need of the full 
protection of law from obtaining the enforcement sought and entitled.  
This Part proceeds in the three sections: Part I.A addresses the need 
for enforcement as a critical step in policy making efforts and 
elaborates on the reputed enforcement gap widening between written 
law and those people the laws were written to protect.  Part I.B 
discusses federal government’s role as a primary enforcer of our 
rights and protections and emphasizes the ways in which the current 
administration has failed to fulfill its duties.  Part I.C discusses the 
frameworks of recent precedential class action litigation and explains 
their legal implications on the private enforcement of rights. 
A. Rights Require Enforcement: The Enforcement Gap and Its 
Impact 
Despite the attention new legislation receives in the press and 
among advocates of all ideologies, once passed, laws protecting our 
rights to fair treatment in the workplace, marketplace, and 
community are chronically under-enforced.  When compared to the 
front-end inputs of policymaking — candidate and ballot measure 
 
 20. 564 U.S. 338, 356 (2011). 
 21. 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
 22. Although affirmative litigation by cities is one solution to strengthen rights 
enforcement, it is not the only one.  Though not discussed in this Article, one 
example is the role that states play in enforcing the rights of our communities. 
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campaigns, legislative proposals, and lobbying — the government has 
underinvested in the back-end enforcement needed to realize those 
laws, leaving community members vulnerable. 
Scholars and practitioners across academic disciplines have 
identified many causes23 of this enforcement gap – including under-
investment and industry capture — but there is little debate that the 
gap exists.24  The gap persists throughout government, from the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) to the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and beyond.25 
This enforcement gap creates a critical hole in the policymaking 
process and blunts the effect of otherwise-strong laws.  Getting laws 
through the legislative process is a necessary but insufficient 
component of policymaking.  However, without implementation and 
enforcement, the intent of legislation may never be realized.  For 
example, if a state were to pass a minimum wage law, but no one 
checks whether companies in fact pay the minimum wage nor are 
there any consequences to failure to pay such a wage, the majority of 
workers likely would not receive the benefit of the new law.  Across 
the ten most populous states in the country, wage theft deprives 
approximately 2.4 million workers of $8 billion per year, with a direct 
 
 23. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 14 (“The problem is not a lack of good law . . . . 
[T]he problem is that due to insufficient funding and staffing, industry capture, or 
some combination of both, these potentially powerful bodies of consumer protection 
law are woefully under-enforced.”); see also supra notes 15–18 and infra note 105. 
 24. “For several decades, scholars and policy experts have pointed out the 
enormous gaps in consumer protection enforcement, and called for a more effective 
approach.” Morris, supra note 14, at 1906–07 (surveying analysis of consumer 
protections and calls for increased enforcement); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Cities 
Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in Public Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL 
SAVE THE WORLD 189 (Ray Brescia & John T. Marshall eds., 2016) (“[C]ivil laws in 
the U.S., particularly those that most directly impact the corporate bottom line — 
such as consumer protection, environmental health, wage-and-hour, and industrial 
safety regulations — are dangerously under-enforced.”). 
 25. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 67 (2010) (identifying the chronic 
underfunding and understaffing of the Consumer Products Safety Commission as a 
cause of the agency’s having “fallen far short of its statutory mandate”); Myriam E. 
Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the 
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1409–10 (2000) (linking 
insufficient staffing to the Department of Justice’s inability to investigate and detect 
unconstitutional police practices); David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? 
Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59 (2006) (noting that, “[b]ecause of limitations in available 
resources in many agencies, and the often-politicized environment surrounding 
regulatory decisions, complaint activities have become in many cases the primary 
driver of enforcement activity” but that, empirically, “there is a significant gap 
between the level of complaint activity and underlying violation rates”). 
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impact on the poverty rate.26  In California, for example, a recent 
report by the Economic Policy Institute found that minimum wage 
violations increased poverty rates among workers who experienced 
wage theft by nearly twenty-three percent.27  In addition, honest 
businesses that pay the required minimum wage suffer from unfair 
competition by their rival companies, which can offer lower prices 
due to their illegally-reduced costs.28  Further, ensuring that policies 
are implemented and enforced reduces the need for additional policy 
and lawmaking and informs smarter, more efficient future policy 
making efforts by road-testing existing laws to see how well they work 
in protecting people from harm. In other words, enforcement is 
essential both to effectuate current policy and to inform future 
policy.29 
B. Rights Require Enforcers: The Absentee Federal Government 
The federal government plays a critical role in enforcing civil 
rights, economic protections, and environmental laws that protect our 
communities.  The current federal administration, including the DOJ 
and other federal agencies, have retreated from this role, meaning 
that fewer enforcers are focused on protecting the rights and 
freedoms that define us as Americans.30 
The nation’s chief law enforcement agency, the DOJ is composed 
of 115,760 employees, ten percent of whom are attorneys, organized 
in forty separate component organizations nationwide.31  The DOJ is 
 
 26. DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POLICY INST., EMPLOYERS 
STEAL BILLIONS FROM WORKERS PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 1 (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-
each-year-survey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-than-the-minimum-
wage-at-significant-cost-to-taxpayers-and-state-economies/ [https://perma.cc/GR5C-
6EQV]. 
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. at 29; see also About Wage Theft, SMART CITIES PREVAIL, 
https://www.smartcitiesprevail.org/about-wage-theft/ [https://perma.cc/4U5K-UQFJ]. 
 29. Agencies frequently use their law enforcement experiences to inform 
policymaking.  For example, in promulgating the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission incorporated its previous law enforcement cases into the 
rulemaking record and noted: “The record, as well as the Commission’s own law 
enforcement experience and that of its state and federal counterparts, supports the 
Commission’s view that the anti-fraud amendments to the TSR are necessary and 
appropriate to protect consumers from significant financial harm.” 80 Fed. Reg. 
77525 (Dec. 14, 2015) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 310). 
      30. See infra note 35. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2017 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT I-3, I-6 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/doj/page/file/1012276/download#introduction 
[https://perma.cc/HA9M-PEZB]. 
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responsible for policing domestic terrorism, curbing insider trading 
and monopolies, addressing violations of tax laws, protecting the 
environment, and enforcing every major piece of federal civil rights 
legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.32 
The current DOJ, however, has retreated from many of these 
critical responsibilities, leading former DOJ administrators and 
legislators to fear that current Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, is 
rolling back civil rights. 33 While the extent and nature of federal 
enforcement necessarily varies over time and from administration to 
administration,34 the hostility of the current federal government to 
 
 32. Id. at I-3 (“The Department’s litigating divisions represent the rights and 
interests of the American people and enforce federal criminal and civil laws. The 
litigating divisions are comprised of the Antitrust (ATR), Civil (CIV), Civil Rights 
(CRT), Criminal (CRM), Environment and Natural Resources (ENRD), and Tax 
(TAX) Divisions. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Office on Violence 
Against Women (OVW), and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) provide leadership and assistance to state, local, and tribal governments.”). 
 33. See Ryan J. Reilly, Exclusive: Here’s Jeff Sessions’ Draft Master Plan for the 
Justice Department, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doj-trump-strategic-plan-civil-
rights_us_5a7120c6e4b0a6aa487457b9 [https://perma.cc/S2NZ-E3AE] (describing the 
anti-civil rights agenda of the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and how 
that agenda is articulated in the Department’s strategic plan.  Vanita Gupta, who 
previously lead the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, said: “I suppose they don’t have the 
item that says ‘roll back civil rights progress’ on their strategic plan, which has been 
what they’ve been doing . . . Frankly they should’ve added that to the list.”); see also 
Carrie Johnson, In His First Year as Attorney General, Sessions Transforms Justice 
in Key Ways, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:52 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/09/583698634/in-his-first-year-as-attorney-general-
sessions-transforms-justice-in-key-ways [https://perma.cc/6P3D-KDPT] (discussing 
how in its first year, the Justice Department rescinded guidance for schools that was 
designed to protect transgender students in bathrooms and locker rooms, issued legal 
briefs arguing that the 1964 civil rights law did not bar discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, turned the civil rights unit away from investigating patterns of 
excessive force and racial profiling by local law enforcement, and stated that the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was “an unconstitutional 
exercise of authority by the executive branch”). 
 34. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 16 (“The Obama administration’s regulation 
took a wide view of how far the federal government could go in its effort to protect 
waters; Mr. Trump directed Mr. Pruitt to take a far narrower view of the law.”); see 
generally Gabriel Florit, 40 Years of Budgets Show Shifting National Priorities, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/budget-
history/?utm_term=.b00baeb55f63 [https://perma.cc/ME99-BD28] (discussing how 
presidential administrations have constructed different discretionary spending limits 
with respect to agencies and programs in their budget proposals). 
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protecting these essential rights is striking,35 exacerbating the 
enforcement gap described in Part I.A.  The DOJ’s articulated 
priorities, for example, no longer include civil rights enforcement, 
replacing it with a focus on “counterterrorism; securing the borders 
and enhancing immigration enforcement; reducing violent crime; and 
promoting ‘integrity, good government and the rule of law.’”36  The 
DOJ’s budget requests are consistent with these statements, outlining 
plans to pour resources into immigration and “rule of law” initiatives, 
while consolidating offices within the Civil Rights Division.37  The 
NAACP, along with a coalition of other prominent civil rights 
organizations, recently sent a letter to the Attorney General decrying 
the DOJ’s failure to include civil rights among its priorities and the 
Department’s actions under his leadership, which, taken together, 
make “explicit” the Attorney General’s “intention to abandon one of 
the most important imperatives of the Department . . . .”38 
 
 35. Sherrilyn Ifill, President Trump’s First Year Was an Affront to Civil Rights, 
TIME (Jan. 17, 2018), http://time.com/5106648/donald-trump-civil-rights-race/ 
[https://perma.cc/9TTP-Y4S4] (“In his first year leading the DOJ, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions may have lost the confidence of the President, but that hasn’t stopped 
the nation’s top law enforcement officer from declining to enforce the law whenever 
civil rights and communities of color are under attack.”); Rob Arthur, Trump’s 
Justice Dep’t Isn’t Enforcing Civil Rights, VICE (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/wj44y4/trumps-justice-department-isnt-enforcing-
civil-rights [https://perma.cc/Q5H4-BBMW] (“The Trump administration is pursuing 
far fewer civil rights cases than its predecessors, a VICE News review of Justice 
Department records shows. Total activity in the agency’s civil rights division is at a 
17-year low, falling well below levels seen in the last two administrations. One DOJ 
section charged with enforcing laws on police department misconduct has been 
completely inactive.”); Jesselyn McCurdy, The Justice Department Continues to Roll 
Back Civil Rights Protections, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2017, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/justice-department-continues-roll-
back-civil-rights-protections [https://perma.cc/7Y5S-ESPZ]; see also supra note 17. 
 36. See Reilly, supra note 33. 
 37. See, e.g., Pema Levy, Justice Dep’t Seeks More Funds for Law Enforcement 
While Squeezing Civil Rights, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 12, 2018, 5:37 PM), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/02/justice-department-seeks-more-funds-
for-law-enforcement-while-squeezing-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/WH54-92LS]; Sari 
Horwitz, Justice Dep’t’s $28 Billion Budget Reflects Sessions’s Priorities, WASH. Post 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-
departments-28-billion-budget-reflects-sessionss-priorities/2018/02/12/acb6a642-1032-
11e8-9065-e55346f6de81_story.html?utm_term=.b14e3f0211b7 
[http://perma.cc/XWE2-94NG]. 
 38. Letter from Derrick Johnson et al., President and CEO, NAACP, to Jefferson 
Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, http://www.naacp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Letter-on-DOJ-Priorities-Final-002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JW5-DQHT] (“ . . . [Y]ou have taken actions that clearly 
reflect . . . in some instances, affirmative hostility to the very civil rights protections 
you are charged with enforcing. Under your leadership, the Department reversed its 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1171 
The DOJ has acted in large part consistently with its articulated 
priorities.  In March 2017, the Attorney General issued a memo 
instructing Department officials to immediately review all 
Department activities, including consent decrees previously reached 
between the Civil Rights Division and local police departments, to 
ensure they were consistent with the administration’s new goals.39  
Days later, the DOJ requested that a federal court postpone the 
implementation of its consent decree with the Baltimore Police 
Department, causing civil rights advocates, law enforcement veterans, 
and the officials responsible for putting the agreement in place to 
express concern.40  In early 2018, the administration effectively closed 
the Office of Access to Justice,41 whose mission was to encourage fair 
and accessible outcomes in the justice system by increasing 
availability of legal assistance to people who cannot afford 
representation.42 
With respect to the Department’s new priorities, the DOJ has 
taken steps to limit the rights of individuals.  For example, the DOJ 
has dispensed with many procedural protections that had been in 
 
long-held position supporting our constitutional challenge to Texas’ voter ID law 
notwithstanding a federal court’s ruling in our favor, rolled back federal policing 
reform efforts, and expressed interest in relitigating the constitutionality of 
affirmative action despite repeated Supreme Court rulings upholding it. Despite a 
57% rise in hate crimes and our explicit request at our meeting that you speak out 
unequivocally against hate crimes and commit increased resources to investigating 
groups and individuals engaged in white supremacist violence, you have failed to 
articulate any measures directly addressed to violent white extremism.”). 
 39. See Memorandum from the Office of the Att’y Gen. to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Att’ys (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148-Consentdecreebaltimore.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8Q3-BWG9]; see also Sari Horwitz et al., Sessions Orders Justice 
Department to Review All Police Reform Agreements, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-orders-justice-
department-to-review-all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-18bd-11e7-
9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.544db3d28052 [http://perma.cc/7RWL-
VGWQ]. 
 40. See Horwitz et al., supra note 39. 
 41. Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Office to Make Legal Aid More Accessible Is 
Quietly Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/politics/office-of-access-to-justice-
department-closed.html [https://nyti.ms/2GD7aVm]. 
 42. See Mission, OFFICE FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/atj [https://perma.cc/R2WF-N5GA] (“ATJ’s mission is 
to help the justice system efficiently deliver outcomes that are fair and accessible to 
all, irrespective of wealth and status. ATJ staff works within the Department of 
Justice, across federal agencies, and with state, local, and tribal justice system 
stakeholders to increase access to counsel and legal assistance and to improve the 
justice delivery systems that serve people who are unable to afford lawyers.”). 
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place for participants in the immigration system.43  In March 2018, the 
Attorney General announced the elimination of a requirement that 
asylum seekers get a full hearing before an immigration judge if the 
judge believes that the claims are fraudulent or unlikely to succeed.44  
Beginning in October 2018, immigration judges will be required to 
speed up their processing of cases to receive satisfactory ratings.45 In 
April 2018, Attorney General Sessions announced a new “zero-
tolerance policy” for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), which prohibits 
illegal entry and attempted illegal entry into the United States.46  
 
 43. See Bea Bischoff, The Kris Kobach Playbook: Jeff Sessions Is Doing 
Everything in His Power to Make Asylum-Seekers Suffer, SLATE (July 10, 2018, 3:50 
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/jeff-sessions-is-doing-everything-in-
his-power-to-make-asylum-seekers-suffer.html [https://perma.cc/78QN-YKET] 
(“Without fanfare, Sessions managed to implement harsher guidelines for children 
appearing in immigration court, limit the ability of immigration attorneys to seek 
continuances, curtail immigrants’ ability to transfer their case to a court closer to 
where they are living, and pack the immigration court benches with former ICE 
attorneys.”); see also Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ 
Policy Encourages Immigration Judges to Cut Corners, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV BLOG 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-
the-border-new-doj-policy-encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners 
[https://perma.cc/3CVL-DCCP] (“In courts with more demanding caseloads, judges 
will often face a choice: protect their economic well-being by cutting due process 
corners or serve as independent adjudicators.”); Vann R. Newkirk II, The End of 
Civil Rights,  ATLANTIC (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/sessions/563006/ 
[https://perma.cc/L34A-LRVW] (“Sessions has recently pushed for changes in the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the immigration-court system 
embedded within the DOJ. He’s considering ways to force judges to process more 
deportation cases, changes that several experts say will undoubtedly mean that fewer 
people receive due process or fair hearings.”). See generally Memorandum from 
James R. McHenry III, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, to the Office of 
the Chief Immigration Judge et al. (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1026721/download [https://perma.cc/7G67-
72RC]; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Announces Zero-
Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1015996/download 
[https://perma.cc/Z5SE-W6C7]. 
 44. See, e.g., Antonio Olivo, Advocates Say Sessions’s Decision to Toss Rule on 
Asylum Hearings Endangers Thousands, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/advocates-sessions-decision-to-
toss-rule-on-asylum-hearings-endangers-thousands/2018/03/07/24b63b24-2214-11e8-
94da-ebf9d112159c_story.html?utm_term=.867f3dc4f6be [http://perma.cc/L6QQ-
6SB8]. 
 45. See, e.g., Willa Frej, DOJ Slaps Quotas on Immigration Judges to Speed 
Deportations, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2018, 7:58 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doj-quotas-on-immigration-judges-to-speed-
deportations_us_5ac346cbe4b04646b645d061 [https://perma.cc/JEY2-MKY7]. 
 46. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy 
for Criminal Illegal Entry, supra note 43. 
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Since the implementation of that policy, hundreds of children have 
been separated from their parents at the U.S. border.47 
The DOJ is not alone.  Other federal agencies charged with 
protecting civil, economic, and environmental rights have similarly 
abandoned their efforts to enforce these rights.  The Department of 
Education has scaled back investigations into civil rights violations at 
public schools and universities,48 sought less funding for civil rights 
enforcement,49 and removed protections for transgender students and 
victims of sexual assault on campuses nationwide.50  Similarly, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has historically “been 
instrumental in setting policy priorities and writing and enforcing a 
wide range of laws that have literally changed the face of the Earth 
for the better.”51  But, this administration’s EPA has sought to arrest 
— if not to undo — much of this progress.  The EPA Administrator 
has called for revised, more permissive, emissions standards for cars 
and trucks52 and has loosened regulations on air pollution by 
decreasing the penalties and corrective action required for companies 
 
 47. See Julia Ainsley & Jane C. Timm, 1,995 Children Separated from Families at 
Border Under ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy, NBC (June 15, 2018, 3:37 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/1-995-children-separated-families-
border-under-zero-tolerance-policy-n883716 [https://perma.cc/98JW-JAV7]. 
 48. See Erica L. Green, Education Dept. Says It Will Scale Back Civil Rights 
Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/politics/education-department-civil-rights-
betsy-devos.html [https://nyti.ms/2szkO7x]. 
 49. See id. (“In the administration’s budget request for the fiscal year that begins 
in October [2017], the Education Department has proposed cutting more than 40 
staff positions from the office of civil rights . . . .”). 
 50. See, e.g., Cory Turner & Anya Kamenetz, The Education Department Says It 
Won’t Act on Transgender Student Bathroom Access, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/02/12/585181704/the-education-department-
says-it-wont-act-on-transgender-student-bathroom-access [https://perma.cc/A8KP-
LKDV]; Stephanie Saul & Kate Taylor, Betsy DeVos Reverses Obama-Era Policy on 
Campus Sexual Assault Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/us/devos-colleges-sex-
assault.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=5F670DE371F884B156C245B6A254BE
2B&gwt=pay [https://nyti.ms/2yiif9l]. 
 51. Environmental Enforcer: How Effective Has the EPA Been in Its First 40 
Years?, SCI. AM.: EARTHTALK,  https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-epa-
first-40-years/ [https://perma.cc/5HQY-9Y2N]. 
 52. Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions Standards 
for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-
cars-and-light-trucks-should-be [https://perma.cc/VDG4-VUMV]. 
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found to be polluting.53  The administration has also backed away 
from efforts to stop or mitigate the effects of global climate change.54 
Similar retrenchment is evident in consumer protection 
enforcement at the federal level.  In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2008, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) to provide increased accountability for enforcing 
federal consumer financial laws and protecting consumers in the 
financial marketplace.55  During its first six years, the CFPB pursued 
an ambitious enforcement agenda, bringing cases to address illegal, 
predatory practices related to mortgages, debt collection, payday 
loans, student loans, credit reporting, and deposit products.56  In that 
 
 53. See, e.g., Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, Assistant Adm’r, Office of 
Air & Radiation, EPA, to Reg’l Air Div. of Dirs. (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
01/documents/reclassification_of_major_sources_as_area_sources_under_section_112
_of_the_clean_air_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BP6-M3KR]; Michael Greshko et al., A 
Running List of How President Trump Is Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 21, 2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-
trump-is-changing-science-environment/ [https://perma.cc/RE7V-B5GS]. 
 54. See, e.g., Greshko et al., supra note 53. Cf. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 22–23 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PV6-KG3U]; Richard Gonzales, FEMA Drops ‘Climate 
Change’ from Its Strategic Plan, NPR (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/15/594140026/fema-drops-climate-
change-from-its-strategic-plan [https://perma.cc/3QZR-2GAP]. 
 55. 12 U.S.C. §5491(a) (2010); About Us: The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ 
[https://perma.cc/4THQ-XVDB]. 
 56. See, e.g., Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2018-
BCFP-0001 (Apr. 20, 2018) (brought against Wells Fargo for improper mortgage 
practices); CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:17-CV-80495, 2017 WL 1408216 (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 20, 2017) (case brought against Owcen Financial Corporation for a 
multitude of improper loan practices); CFPB v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-
RDM, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (bringing suit against Navient for 
improper servicing and collection of student loans); CFPB v. Final Judgment and 
Order for Restitution, Disgorgement, a Civil Money Penalty, and Permanent 
Injunction Against Defendant Stephen Lyster Siringoringo, No. an Individual, Also 
D/B/A Siringoringo Law Firm, CFPB v. CFPB v. Siringoringo, No. 8:14-cv-01155-JVS 
(AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016); CFPB v. Cashcall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-
JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (bringing suit against 
CashCall for improperly collecting loans that state-licensing and usury laws rendered 
partially void or uncollectible); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB 
No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 22, 2016); Consent Order, CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 
No. 13-cv-2025 (RMC), 2016 WL 1717364 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2016); Consent Order, In 
re Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0028 (Oct. 29, 2015) (bringing suit 
against General Information Services for improper credit reporting practices); CFPB 
v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194, 2015 WL 10854380 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 
2015) (bringing suit against Corinthian Colleges in violation of the Fair Debt 
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time, the Bureau’s supervisory and enforcement work resulted in 
orders of approximately $11.9 billion in relief to over 29 million 
consumers across the U.S.57 
This approach changed dramatically in November 2017, when 
President Trump appointed Mick Mulvaney Acting Director of the 
CFPB.58  Mulvaney, who also leads the Office of Management and 
Budget, had been outspoken in his opposition to the CFPB and its 
mission, calling the Bureau a “sick, sad joke.”59  The Acting Director 
subsequently took steps consistent with his articulated value of the 
Bureau’s mission.  He requested no funding from the Federal Reserve 
for the second quarter of the 2018 Fiscal Year,60 despite the fact that 
the budget devoted to the Bureau’s enforcement efforts had not 
decreased in the preceding years.61  In February 2018, the Bureau 
 
Collection Practices Act); CFPB v. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order with 
Respect to CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
CFPB No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2015) (bringing suit against Wells 
Fargo for improper loan collection practices); Consent Order, In re Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0002 (Jan. 22, 2015); Consent Order, In re ACE 
Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 10, 2014) (bringing suit against 
Ace Cash Express in connection with its collection of payday loans); CFPB v. 
Cashcall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (GAO), 2014 WL 10321537 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2014) 
(bringing suit against CashCall for improperly collecting loans that state laws 
rendered void or limited the consumer’s obligation to repay). 
 57. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FACTSHEET, CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU: BY THE NUMBERS (July 2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201707_cfpb_by-
the-numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4PV-XS35]. 
 58. Renae Merle, The CFPB Now Has Two Acting Directors. And Nobody 
Knows Which One Should Lead the Federal Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/24/the-cfpb-now-has-two-
acting-directors-and-nobody-knows-which-one-should-lead-the-federal-
agency/?utm_term=.6a0092c3ee77 [https://perma.cc/P5SM-8DV4]. 
 59. Victoria Guida, Trump Taps Mulvaney to Head CFPB, Sparking Confusion 
over Agency’s Leadership, POLITICO (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/24/richard-cordray-successor-cfpb-leandra-
english-259612 [https://perma.cc/9SZM-2CUE]. 
 60. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Protection 
Bureau, to The Honorable Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fy2018_q2_funding-request-
letter-to-frb.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2R-KZZG]. 
 61. The spending by the Bureau division that includes its enforcement function, 
Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending, had steadily increased leading up to 
Mulvaney’s assuming leadership. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE 
FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2012), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_CFO-Q4-Update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2JA-V3ZU]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR 
THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2013), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_cfo-q4-update.pdf 
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issued an updated strategic plan that offers notably fewer specifics 
and accountability metrics about its enforcement work than previous 
iterations.62  More recently, the Acting Director proposed dramatic 
cuts to the Bureau’s authority.63  He has also indicated a desire to 
defer to other enforcers.64  In practice, however, this approach has 
resulted in inaction and retrenchment. The Bureau has brought eight 
enforcement actions since the Acting Director was appointed in late 
November 2017.65  It dismissed a pending lawsuit it had previously 
 
[https://perma.cc/4F2T-UXEK]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR 
THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2014), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_cfo-quarterly-update_q4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TZ3R-F6RL]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR 
THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201511_cfpb_cfo-quarterly-update_q4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JA34-W4BP]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFO UPDATE FOR 
THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201612_cfpb_CFO-
Update-FY16Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZFR-T38K]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
CFO UPDATE FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER OF FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201712_cfpb_CFO-
Update-FY2017Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/47KF-2LD2]. 
 62. Compare CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018–2022 
(Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_strategic-
plan_fy2018-fy2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3ZT-VP64] with CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2013–FY 2017 (Apr. 2013), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E54U-X3LM]. 
 63. The Acting Director requested that: 
Congress make four changes to the law to establish meaningful 
accountability for the Bureau: (1) Fund the Bureau through Congressional 
appropriations; (2) Require legislative approval of major Bureau rules; (3) 
Ensure that the Director answers to the President in the exercise of 
executive authority; and (4) Create an independent Inspector General for 
the Bureau. 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. PROTECTION BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 2 (2018), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_semi-annual-report_spring-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5EU-GL4G]. 
 64. At a 2018 meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General, the 
Acting Director announced that the Bureau “would be looking to the state regulators 
and states attorney general for a lot more leadership when it comes to enforcement.” 
Allison Schoenthal, Insight: A Shift in Regulation from the CFPB to the States, 
Bloomberg BNA (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-shift-regulation-
n73014482021/ [https://perma.cc/V9L3-L377]. 
 65. Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/5JRE-H624].  Comparatively, the CFPB took twenty-three 
enforcement actions between January 1 and August 15, 2017; in 2016, it took 
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filed to address alleged unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices and 
regulatory violations by four online lenders that had allegedly 
collected debt not legally owed and failed to disclose the true cost of 
credit.66  Moreover, there have been additional reports of the 
Bureau’s closing pending investigations, consistent with the Acting 
Director’s more limited view of the agency’s role.67 
In sum, agencies across the federal government have curtailed their 
efforts to detect and correct potential illegal behavior in a variety of 
industries and under an array of laws.  Such a retreat poses both 
functional and theoretical problems for our democracy.  From a 
functional perspective, it means fewer people have recourse when an 
employer, lender, or landlord harms them, even when that harm 
violates existing law.  From a theoretical perspective, the net effect of 
the federal government’s inaction is that laws duly passed by 
Congress as representatives of the People have decreased in force and 
effect.  This erodes the legitimacy of our representative government. 
C. Other Enforcers Are Restricted: Inability of Private Plaintiffs to 
Effectively Vindicate Their Own Rights 
As explained in Part I.B, the federal government is currently on the 
sidelines when it comes to rights enforcement.68  If the federal 
government was but one of many actors in the enforcement 
landscape, the effect of its inaction would be limited.  However, the 
 
seventeen actions during that same period, and in 2015, it took thirty-seven. Id.; see 
also Alan S. Kaplinsky, How Long Can Mick Mulvaney Serve as CFPB Acting 
Director?, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/02/27/how-long-can-mick-mulvaney-
serve-as-cfpb-acting-director/ [https://perma.cc/KZX3-MK6A] (observing that 
Mulvaney’s appointment as Acting Director became effective on November 25, 
2017); Kate Berry, CFPB’s Mulvaney Looks to Rein in ‘Tyranny’ of Agency He 
Runs, AM. BANKER (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpbs-
mulvaney-looks-to-rein-in-tyranny-of-agency-he-runs?feed=00000158-babc-dda9-
adfa-fefef5720000 [https://perma.cc/JN8Q-SCRM] (noting that by April 2018, 
Mulvaney had already dropped six actions against payday lenders). 
 66. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), CFPB v. 
Golden Valley Lending, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02521 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2017); Complaint 
for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, CFPB v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., 
No. 17-cv-3155 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017). 
 67. “Since the Trump administration took over the CFPB in November, the 
bureau temporarily froze new regulations and instituted a review of enforcement 
activities under acting director Mick Mulvaney, a longtime critic of the agency. The 
CFPB hasn’t filed any new enforcement actions since November.” Yuka Hayashi, 
States Target Consumer Issues as Federal Oversight Eases, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-target-consumer-issues-as-federal-
oversight-eases-1522920601 [https://perma.cc/T4SM-2M5B]. 
 68. See supra Section I.B. 
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alternative enforcers — private plaintiffs — are increasingly 
restrained in their ability to vindicate their own rights as a result of 
evolutions in the law on class action lawsuits.  This Part discusses the 
compounding challenge of limited private enforcement that, together 
with decreased federal enforcement, further widen the gap between 
law and reality. 
Class actions, permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 
allow individuals who are victims of fraud or discrimination to pursue 
legal claims as a group when they have each experienced similar 
harms.69  The use of class actions as a tool for private enforcement of 
public laws has a long history in our legal system.70  Despite criticism 
for misuse, class actions are widely recognized as an important tool 
for individual plaintiffs to seek redress for harms that may not be 
feasible to litigate on their own.71  Consumer advocates in particular 
favor the ability of would-be plaintiffs to pursue class actions.72  Class 
actions correct for what can otherwise be an insurmountable 
imbalance between an individual’s relatively small harm and a 
corporation’s outsized illegal gains across a large population of 
consumers.73  For example, if a company denies overtime to 10,000 
workers with an average lost wage of $500 per worker, the cost of 
litigating each individual case would dwarf the harm suffered by each 
worker, despite a sizeable total harm of $5,000,000. 
 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see also generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 70. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 624–27. 
 71. Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 
U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770–71 (2012) (“Class actions are admittedly controversial, 
viewed by some businesses as ‘legalized blackmail,’ yet also regarded as serving an 
important public function allowing ‘those who are less powerful to band together – 
using lawyers as their champions’ – to seek redress of grievances that would ‘go 
unremedied if each litigant had to fight alone.’”) (internal citation omitted); see also 
Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of 
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1714 (2006) (“Despite 
perceived shortcomings and criticisms of misuse, class actions are an important 
procedural joinder device in our public justice system for bringing claims on behalf of 
a large number of individuals when it may be economically unfeasible to assert claims 
individually.”) [hereinafter Universes Colliding]. 
 72. “Without class actions, it is often infeasible for a consumer to hire a lawyer to 
pursue a claim for a small dollar amount. Class actions also enable courts to assess 
and remedy the full scope of a company’s wrongdoing.” Class Actions & Access to 
Justice, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR, https://www.nclc.org/issues/arbitration-class-
actions.html [https://perma.cc/6JM5-E6Z8]. 
 73. Id. 
2018] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1179 
Even with the documented benefits of class actions as both a 
deterrent to74 and a remedy for illegal conduct, the road to bringing a 
class action to address widespread misconduct is steadily more 
treacherous.75  Consumer advocates bemoan the limitations of 
contracts that require adjudication of consumer claims through 
arbitration, particularly when the contract specifies that the 
arbitration must be pursued individually, rather than on a class 
basis.76  These so-called “forced arbitration” clauses keep consumers 
and employees from reaching a courtroom.77  Additionally, they limit 
the arbitrator’s ability to understand the full extent of a company’s 
illegal behavior, because the case cannot be presented on behalf of 
the full class of harmed victims.78 
The Supreme Court has erected even more onerous barriers to 
many plaintiffs’ ability to seek justice through the court system.  In 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,79 the Court clarified and tightened 
the scope of Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, explaining 
that “proof of commonality necessarily overlap[ped] with 
respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engage[d] in a pattern 
 
 74. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing?, in THE CLASS 
ACTION EFFECT 180–203 (Catherine Piché ed., 2018) (evaluating critiques of class 
actions and concluding that “the conventional view that the class action can be 
justified by the deterrence rationale alone remains sound”); see generally Russell M. 
Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1997 (2016) 
(arguing that individual victim compensation increases the deterrent effects of class 
actions). 
 75. Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 71, at 1714–15 (observing a “trend in 
corporate America to require the submission of disputes to private arbitration rather 
than to courts of law via predispute arbitration provisions in a range of contracts 
involving consumer, employment, health care, and business transactions” and noting 
that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) further restricts judicial class 
actions by prohibiting litigants from filing judicial class actions involving national 
claims in state courts). 
 76. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Opinion, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-
sue-companies.html [https://nyti.ms/2vjWRyP]; see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing 
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an 
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 132 (1997). 
 77. Forced Arbitration, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR, 
https://www.nclc.org/issues/forced-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/K3QJ-8DDW]. 
 78. Id. (“Forced arbitration clauses are found in fine print in contracts for bank 
accounts, student loans, cell phones, employment, nursing homes and more.  These 
clauses deprive people of their day in court when a company violates the law, forcing 
victims into a system that is often biased, secretive and lawless.  Forced arbitration 
clauses often contain class action bans that prevent either a judge or an arbitrator 
from seeing or addressing the full extent of a company’s wrongdoing.”). 
 79. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
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or practice of discrimination.”80  The Court held that the employees’ 
statistical and testimonial evidence of employment discrimination did 
not provide sufficient proof that they suffered the same injury or that 
their Title VII claims depended on answers to common questions.81  
Just months earlier, the Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion82 held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state 
law prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration agreements.83  It 
thus barred the plaintiff consumers in this case from pursuing a class 
complaint in federal court against AT&T and instead required them 
to proceed through arbitration on an individual basis.84  And in May 
2018, in its 5-4 decision in Epic Systems Corporation v. Lewis, the 
court held that employers can contractually forbid workers from 
arbitrating legal disputes as a class.85 
Taken together, Wal-Mart, Concepcion, and Epic Systems raise the 
barriers to entry for class certification in every federal class action 
matter and allow potential defendants to insulate themselves from 
class-action lawsuits or class arbitrations by drafting their contracts to 
prohibit such a remedy.  In the wake of Wal-Mart and Concepcion, 
scholars and practitioners alike have identified challenges for putative 
plaintiffs attempting class certification or proceeding to vindicate 
their rights as a class even if they meet the more stringent 
requirements for certification.86  Having to satisfy the Wal-Mart 
commonality requirement makes it much harder for plaintiffs to 
address widespread harm, particularly when defendants are 
increasingly large corporations.87  Paradoxically, the greater and more 
 
 80. See id. at 352. 
 81. See id. at 356. 
 82. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 83. “Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the 
FAA.” Id. at 343. 
 84. See id. at 352. 
 85. 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). 
 86. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Opinion, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action 
Suits, SFGATE (Nov. 7, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-could-end-class-action-
suits-3246898.php [https://perma.cc/33QS-AWEZ]; see also Forced Arbitration, supra 
note 77. 
 87. Sarah Kellogg, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, WASH. LAWYER (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-
lawyer/articles/september-2011-walmart-dukes.cfm [https://perma.cc/SB76-6RMQ] 
(“While the Dukes decision won’t eliminate all class action lawsuits, it will severely 
curtail similar employment discrimination cases, and will most certainly impact the 
presentation and success rates of class actions for securities cases and mass torts.  By 
handing defendants the ammunition, they need to effectively slay mega–classes, the 
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widespread the harm, the more difficult it is to obtain relief and 
accountability for that harm.  And Wal-Mart requires plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief to present — and courts to assess — the 
merits of their case at the class certification stage, effectively making 
cases harder and more expensive to initiate.88  These hurdles, 
combined with the acceptability of class waivers under Concepcion, 
mean that individual plaintiffs and their representatives have far 
fewer options for vindicating their rights than they once did.89  Each 
of these barriers benefit large corporations at the expense of 
individual consumers and workers, regardless of the legal merits of 
their claims. 
Notably, the other branches of the current federal government 
have joined the federal judiciary in signaling support for the move 
toward permitting mandatory arbitration and class waivers.  In late 
2017, for example, pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 
Congress passed and the President signed a joint resolution 
disapproving the final rule published by the CFPB that would have 
limited companies’ ability to use mandatory arbitration clauses and to 
bar consumers from participating in class action lawsuits.90 
 
Court has seriously undermined the class action lawsuit today and in the future.”).  
See also Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the 
Future of Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 
711, 728 (2013) (“In procedural terms, the dissimilarities approach, which is now a 
part of the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality inquiry, will prove an especially high hurdle in 
cases that present facts that conflict with judges’ worldview.  It was evident in this 
case, as it has been in many other employment discrimination cases at every level of 
court, that the majority of judges do not believe that employment discrimination 
occurs very often.  And it was this worldview that prompted the majority to find the 
claims of commonality essentially implausible.  For other legal wrongs that courts 
find unlikely to occur, like the antitrust claim in Twombly and the civil rights claim in 
Iqbal, the chances of framing a successful class action seem very slim.”). 
 88. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 658–59 (noting that “[c]lass actions are 
on the ropes” in part because of the “development of a standard under which 
plaintiffs are required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence – just as they 
would at trial – any fact necessary to meet the requirements of Rule 23, even if it also 
goes to the merits.  This requirement is at its most potent in damages cases under 
Rule 23(b)(3), where plaintiffs are obligated to establish the predominance of 
common issues.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v 
Dukes, meanwhile, largely carries these heightened requirements over into the 
injunctive realm, by redefining the hitherto easy-to-satisfy commonality requirement 
of Rule 23(a)(2).”). 
 89. Id. at 660 (“All of this, coupled with the Supreme Court’s embrace of class 
action waivers, radically restricts the continued ability of private actors to vindicate 
public rights via the class action mechanism.”). 
 90. See generally Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55500 (Nov. 22, 2017) 
(CRA revocation), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/11/22/2017-
25324/arbitration-agreements [https://perma.cc/6JKQ-RPK8]; see also CONSUMER 
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While the full impact of these decisions may not yet be realized,91 
scholars and practitioners predict lasting and destructive ripple effects 
on the ability of individuals to enforce their own rights.  According to 
the CFPB’s 2015 Arbitration Study, tens of millions of consumers use 
consumer financial products or services that are subject to pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses.92  And nearly all of the arbitration clauses the 
CFPB studied contained prohibitions on proceeding as a class.93 
Scholars highlight the improbability of consumers pursuing 
individual arbitrations.94  This analysis is consistent with how 
consumers predict their own behavior even when faced with being 
scammed or defrauded.  When the CFPB asked consumers how they 
would respond to being assessed erroneous credit card fees, they 
learned that consumers seldom even contemplate bringing formal 
claims in any forum — litigation or arbitration — even when such 
avenues as customer service have proven unavailing.95 
These trends have already had an impact in the courts.  In the wake 
of Wal-Mart, courts have denied class certifications in matters 
involving, for instance, violations of constitutional rights by city police 
departments and insufficient wage payments.96  Further, consistent 
 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies from Using 
Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-
companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-people-their-day-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/3WUK-FD6M]. 
 91. In its 2015 Arbitration Study, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
found an upward trend in the use of arbitration clauses post-Concepcion, but noted 
that the increase was not as dramatic as predicted by some commentators. See 
CONUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: 
ARBITRATION STUDY § 2 at 12 (Mar. 2015), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KZ-J3CS]; see also Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 
n.166 (citing studies showing a decline in class certification in the years 2009 to 2012). 
 92. See generally CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: ARBITRATION 
STUDY, supra note 91. 
 93. Id. § 1 at 10 (“Across each product market included in the study, 85–100% of 
the contracts with arbitration clauses . . . include such no-class arbitration provisions.  
Although these terms effectively preclude all class proceedings, in court or in 
arbitration, some arbitration clauses also expressly waive the consumer’s ability to 
participate in class actions in court.”). 
 94. Gilles & Friedman, supra note 14, at 633–34. 
 95. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: ARBITRATION STUDY, supra 
note 92, at §1 at 11. 
 96. Haus v. City of New York, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155735, at *292–95 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011) (denying class certification because seventeen plaintiffs 
seeking relief for violations of their constitutional rights had not met the 
requirements of Rule 23, including the commonality requirements as clarified by 
Wal-Mart); St. Pierre v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., No. 4:13-CV-13202-TSH, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
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with the Concepcion Court’s acknowledgment that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) “reflect[s] both a ‘liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration 
is a matter of contract,’”97 courts routinely find arbitration clauses 
enforceable.98  Courts have also followed Concepcion’s holding that a 
state “cannot require a procedure [like class arbitration] that is 
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons”99 in granting motions to compel arbitration in matters 
related to, for example, price fixing,100 failure to pay wages,101 and the 
purchase of cell phone services.102  The Supreme Court relied on 
Concepcion in its Epic Systems decision to expand its core holding to 
 
LEXIS 18492, at *12 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (denying class certification in a matter 
related to employer compensation because plaintiffs had not met their burden under 
Wal-Mart “to demonstrate the nature of their alleged injury and to show that other 
members of the class suffered the same harm.”). But see Langendorf v. Skinnygirl 
Cocktails LLC, No. 11 CV 7060, 306 F.R.D. 574, at *580–81 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2014) 
(applying Wal-Mart and finding that the commonality requirement of Rule 23 was 
satisfied, but declining to certify the class based on inadequacy of representation). 
 97. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 98. See generally Ribeiro v. Sedgwick LLP, No. C 16-04507 WHA, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 152896 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (granting defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration based on the signed arbitration agreement in a putative class action 
alleging gender-based pay and promotion discrimination); see Meyer v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017) (applying the FAA and state contract law to 
grant defendant Uber’s motion to compel arbitration in putative class action where 
the arbitration provision was “reasonably conspicuous” to the plaintiff, and that he 
had “unambiguously manifested his assent” to be bound by the contract’s terms of 
service). 
 99. 563 U.S. at 351. 
 100. In re Online Travel Co. (OTC) Hotel Booking Antitrust Litig., 953 F. Supp. 
2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in 
consolidated proceeding alleging price fixing against online travel and hotel 
companies and explaining that, according to Concepcion, a state “cannot require a 
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons”). 
 101. Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (granting 
defendant’s motion to compel individual arbitration in a putative class action seeking 
redress for failure to pay wages owed to employees upon termination because 
defendant had not waived its right to seek arbitration, the arbitration agreement was 
not unconscionable under state law, and, under Concepcion, requiring class 
arbitration when an arbitration agreement precluded it was “inconsistent with the 
FAA”). 
 102. Sidney v. Verizon Comm., No. 17 CV 1850 (RJD)(RLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48485, at *7–9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018) (granting defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration in putative class action arising out of fraudulent purchase of cell 
phone and service on plaintiff’s account because, under Concepcion and related 
precedent, the parties’ arbitration agreement and the class action waiver contained in 
it were both enforceable). 
1184 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
employment contracts, explaining that “courts may not allow a 
contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by 
mandating class-wide arbitration procedures without the parties’ 
consent.”103 
II.  FIXING THE DESIGN FLAW: CITIES AS ENGINES OF JUSTICE 
As Part I illuminates, two major enforcers – the federal 
government and private plaintiffs – have been at least partially 
removed from the enforcement landscape.104  Federal retrenchment 
and restriction of private enforcement only exacerbates an already-
present enforcement vacuum.105  With enforcers at the federal level 
 
 103. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“Just as judicial 
antagonism toward arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment ‘manifested 
itself in a great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration against public 
policy,’ Concepcion teaches that we must be alert to new devices and formulas that 
would achieve much the same result today. And a rule seeking to declare 
individualized arbitration proceedings off limits is, the Court held, just such a 
device.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 104. See supra Part I. 
 105. See Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 918 
(2014),  http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/61-4-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9SV-TZ8W] 
(“While enactment-enforcement gaps are widespread in criminal law, this 
discrepancy is uniquely significant in the context of laws that are understood to ‘send 
a message.’”); Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal 
Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“Prosecutors 
with large caseloads lack the resources to take every case to trial.”); Cook County to 
Stop Prosecuting Some Traffic Offenses Because It Lacks Resources, Foxx’s Office 
Says, CHI. TRIB. (June 15, 2017, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-states-attorney-traffic-offense-
prosecution-20170615-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y89F-C7BR]; Lisa Rein & 
Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureaucracy, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-is-
changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-
fb0995360725_story.html?utm_term=.255048a9146a [https://perma.cc/F3BC-FSMP] 
(describing the “crippling” effect on enforcement from the large number of 
supervisors who have left OSHA, because supervisors have to review potential 
enforcement actions); Suzy Khim, EPA Enforcement Actions Hit 10-Year Low in 
2017, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-
house/epa-enforcement-actions-hit-10-year-low-2017-n846151 
[https://perma.cc/3MAL-T6A7] (“The past fiscal year marked a historic low for 
enforcement actions across the board: The number of new civil and criminal cases, 
defendants charged, and federal EPA inspections and evaluations all reached their 
lowest levels in at least a decade, according to the data.”); Eric Lipton & Danielle 
Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits 
on Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2jDgT4c]; Kathleen Majorsky, Enforcement Gap Reveals Difference 
Between State Laws and Practices, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY: STATE 
INTEGRITY 2012, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/20/18734/enforcement-gap-
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withdrawing and private plaintiffs increasingly powerless, state 
attorneys general are working hard to fill this void,106 but there is 
significantly more to do. 
 
reveals-difference-between-state-laws-and-practices [https://perma.cc/HV49-HLQ6]; 
Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local 
Public Law Offices, reprinted in PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN 
PUBLIC INTEREST COLLOQUIUM AT  YALE LAW SCHOOL, WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: 
FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, & PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 51, 52 (2008), 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/liman_whyTheLocalMatters.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VG3F-SR6T] (“[C]ities are often culturally indifferent (or even 
resistant) to bringing affirmative cases even when they are not legally restrained from 
undertaking such work.”); The Enforcement Gap: Federal Gun Laws Ignored, 
AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION 1, 2 (2003), 
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/10/AGS_Report_-_The_Enforcement_Gap_-
_Federal_Gun_Laws_Ignored.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3X7-EME7] (“There is a vast 
enforcement gap between the level of federal gun crimes and the number of federal 
prosecutions.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp. & Navient Sol., LLC, No. 3:02-at-
06000 (M.D. Penn. filed Oct. 5, 2017) 
http://media.philly.com/documents/Pa.+v.+Navient.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8DN-
7Q7H]; Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G. 
Schneiderman Leads 11 Attorneys General Opposing Trump Dept. of Labor 
Program to Offer Amnesty to Labor Law Violators (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-11-attorneys-general-opposing-
trump-dept-labor-program-offer [https://perma.cc/9K2E-ZNHN]; 3 Enforcement 
Priorities for State AGs in 2018, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.foley.com/3-enforcement-priorities-for-state-ags-in-2018-01-08-2018/ 
[http://perma.cc/7H99-89WZ]; Rachel M. Cohen, The Hour of the Attorneys 
General: State Democratic AGs Have Assumed New Importance in the Effort to 
Contain the Trump Presidency, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2017), 
http://prospect.org/article/hour-attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/LX3K-59X7]; 
Lauren Dezenski, In Fight Against Trump, Democratic AGs Take a Page from GOP: 
States Are Bringing a Growing String of Lawsuits, Complaints and Other Actions 
Against the Trump Administration — and There’s No End in Sight, POLITICO (Feb. 
7, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/democratic-attorneys-
general-trump-393651 [https://perma.cc/P35S-VG4M]; Edward-Isaac Dovere, The 
New AG Itching to Take on Trump: New Jersey Attorney General Gurbir Grewal 
Has Jurisdiction over 20 Trump Properties and Is Ready to Step into Eric 
Schneiderman’s Void, POLITICO (May 23, 2018, 5:03 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/23/new-jersey-attorney-general-trump-603284 
[https://perma.cc/R7XW-7D7R]; Yuka Hayashi, States Target Consumer Issues as 
Federal Oversight Eases, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2018, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-target-consumer-issues-as-federal-oversight-
eases-1522920601 [https://perma.cc/KZH7-VGGB]; Barbara S. Mishkin, 
Pennsylvania AG Creates Consumer Financial Protection Unit, BALLARD SPAHR 
LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/07/24/pennsylvania-ag-creates-
consumer-financial-protection-unit/ [https://perma.cc/H32Q-MUP6]; Gregory 
Roberts, States Standing By to Fill ‘Imminent’ CFPB Enforcement Gap, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-standing-fill-
n73014452991/ [https://perma.cc/93VS-JR74]. 
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The precarious state of rights enforcement in the United States 
today exposes a serious design flaw in our system.  Reliance on only 
one level of government to protect our most basic rights subjects the 
fate of those rights to the unpredictable results of single elections.  
Our system allows an electoral pendulum swing to significantly 
impact the protection of our core rights.  This is a flaw requiring 
repair. A more effective system would guard against the de facto 
nullification of protections we have already agreed upon as a society 
because there are not enough proverbial “cops on the beat.” 
Cities have the ability to file affirmative litigation to protect public 
rights and address illegal behavior, and thus are an important solution 
to this design flaw.  Not only are cities a solution to address under-
enforcement of public rights, but also, they have a permanent role to 
play in advancing their residents’ rights and the national conversation 
on critical issues. 
This Part discusses the value of redundancy for effective, ongoing 
rights enforcement and how cities, through their ability to file 
affirmative cases to address harms to their communities, are key to 
establishing a desirable rights enforcement framework.  It also 
addresses the role cities play in diversifying our system of rights 
enforcement by virtue of the unique position they inhabit.  As the 
closest representatives to their communities, cities take the final step 
of policymaking when they enforce existing laws.  And, in so doing, 
they fulfill their role as representatives of their communities.  Finally, 
cities have the unique ability to push forward social progress in ways 
consistent with the will of the People at the most local level. 
A. Multiple Enforcers Are Desirable to Protect Public Rights 
The examples described in this Article make clear that we as a 
society need enforcers at multiple levels of government focusing on 
civil rights, environmental protections, and consumer laws.  Our 
society and the problems we face have become sufficiently complex 
that we need both policymaking and enforcement to happen at all 
levels of government.107  In this section, we argue for redundancy of 
civil enforcement functions. 
 
 107. Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in 
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 510 (2010) 
(“Immigration, climate change, labor standards, and the economic crisis are high-
profile examples of the fact that it is no longer possible — nor is it desirable — to 
think, decide, and implement rules and policies only at the federal level or at the state 
level or at the local level; rather, it has become necessary to govern them at many 
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Cities are largely untapped resources that are well positioned to 
step in to protect our public rights through their ability to file 
affirmative litigation.108  This work by cities is more critical now than 
ever.  The current federal climate makes abundantly clear the 
importance of redundancy by design: multiple enforcers with 
authority to ensure that protections enshrined in law convert to real 
protections on the ground.  Just as hospitals have multiple generators 
to hedge against a single point of failure, so should our democracy 
feature multiple options to enforce our legal and constitutional rights.  
Or to use a more modern example, this recommendation is not unlike 
applying the theory behind blockchain to our democratic system.  Just 
as blockchain stores information over a distributed network so that 
no central repository can corrupt the data,109 so too do we propose 
empowering a diversity of enforcers across all levels of government 
such that inaction at one level cannot remove all enforcement activity 
from the legal marketplace. 
What is easy to forget in the tumult of the current federal 
administration is that the need for redundancy is not a short-term 
problem or a phenomenon confined to a particular administration.110  
While the current administration’s lack of commitment to enforcing 
core civil rights, economic, and environmental protection laws is 
extreme, the inherent design flaw will persist beyond the conclusion 
of the current federal administration. 
Even when the federal government prioritizes enforcing the public 
rights laws within its jurisdiction, there are matters that federal 
enforcement agencies do not address because of resource 
constraints.111  Every office has to make strategic decisions about how 
to use its resources.  The reality is that enforcement actions and 
affirmative litigation takes significant effort from any agency.112  Even 
 
levels of government — sub-national, national, and supra-national — 
simultaneously.”). 
 108. See Morris, supra note 25, at 201. 
 109. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM 8 (2009), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQB3-P5UJ]. 
 110. See Wolf Heydebrand, Government Litigation and National Policymaking: 
From Roosevelt to Reagan, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 477, 477 (1990) (analyzing litigation 
trends administration over administration and noting that “[t]here is some evidence 
of systematic variation in government litigation and administrative appeals due to an 
‘administration effect’ but there are also secular tendencies suggesting a more general 
‘government’ effect cutting across various administrations”). 
 111. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 105, at 8. 
 112. See, e.g., Charlotte Corley, Will States Fill the CFPB Enforcement Void?, 
AM. BANKER: BANK THINK (June 15, 2018, 9:57 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/will-states-fill-the-cfpb-enforcement-void 
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in times of aggressive enforcement activity, there is more illegal 
behavior than there are resources among enforcers.113  Under the 
Obama administration, for example, the federal government could 
not investigate all the police departments in need of reform, nor could 
it protect consumers from all predatory businesses, despite an 
articulated desire to root out police abuses and predatory lending.114  
To effectively address the current crisis and to more effectively 
preserve our rights in the future, we need to diversify our portfolio of 
civil, economic, and environmental rights investment across the 
country.  Effective enforcement requires cities to be in the mix of 
enforcers.  If we solve for this design flaw now, we protect ourselves 
against the next time factors — such as those described in Part I —
combine to threaten our public rights.  In effect, a diversified 
enforcement portfolio provides a hedge against future threats in any 
one level of government. 
While this recommendation might read as a call for purely 
redundant enforcement functions, that is not our suggestion.  Rather, 
each government office can and should pursue complementary 
enforcement, consistent with their varied statutory authorities and 
jurisdictional constraints, and coordinating where necessary and 
 
[https://perma.cc/H6UR-QBS2] (Charlotte Corley, chair of the Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors and commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Banking and 
Consumer Finance, reflects on the significant time and resources required to pursue 
consumer protection cases and explains that it is essential to have multiple state 
regulatory bodies focused on consumer compliance.). 
 113. See, e.g., Krauss, supra note 105, at 8 (“Prosecutors with large caseloads lack 
the resources to take every case to trial.”); Dara Lind, The  
Government Can’t Enforce Every Law. Who Gets to Decide Which Ones It Does?, 
VOX (Mar. 31, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2015/3/31/8306311/prosecutorial-discretion 
[https://perma.cc/LMW8-53R6] (“[T]he government has limited resources, and 
discretion is the way it makes decisions about how to spend them.”). 
 114. See generally Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General Holder Announces 
President Obama’s Budget Proposes $173 Million for Criminal Justice Reform (Mar. 
4, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-
president-obama-s-budget-proposes-173-million-criminal [https://perma.cc/YWW4-
TD8D]; Press Release Number, U.S. DOJ, Justice Department Announces More 
Than $130 Million in Cost Saving and Efficiency Measures to Utilize Resources More 
Effectively (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-more-130-million-cost-saving-and-efficiency-measures-utilize 
[https://perma.cc/752G-WPS5]; Richard Cordray, Partnering: The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and State Attorneys General, CONSUMER FINANCE 
(Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/partnering-the-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-state-attorneys-general/ 
[https://perma.cc/NU78-FF2T] (discussing the need for the federal government to 
work together with state enforcers “because we can be more effective and efficient by 
working with you to police the financial marketplace”). 
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efficient.  This robust system of rights enforcement could withstand 
fluctuations in the resources and activity of any one enforcer. 
B. Cities Play a Role Distinct from Other Levels of Government 
Affirmative litigation by cities offers unique advantages to 
communities across the country that cannot be fully addressed by 
other levels of government.115  Rights enforcement by cities is 
particularly essential now, but it will always be necessary.  While city 
affirmative litigation can and should complement enforcement work 
done by other government actors, it is not purely redundant with 
those functions.  This section describes diversification as an essential 
companion to redundancy in an effective system of rights 
enforcement. 
1. Cities Are the Closest Representatives of Their Communities 
City affirmative litigation furthers at least two distinct functions of 
government: it is critical for successful policy making at the local level 
and it fulfills cities’ democratic imperative, bolstering their moral 
legitimacy as representatives and guardians of their constituents’ 
interests. Additionally, city affirmative litigation can provide the city 
and its residents compensation for injuries, outstanding debts, 
penalties, and the cost of litigation. 
Under the first function, city-level enforcement is justified as an 
extension of a city’s policymaking authority.  Without enforcement, 
laws enacted at the local level or that localities have the ability to 
enforce will not be fully effectuated.116  As scholar Sarah L. Swan 
argues, “[t]he turn to litigation as a solution . . . is not an affront to 
democracy.”117  Rather, litigation is not inherently less democratic 
than regulation: our system of political and legal governance is set up 
to rely on litigation as a mode of governing; the choice to settle any 
particular litigated matter is up to individual defendants; and, perhaps 
most importantly as it relates to this Article, “the lever that creates 
the possibility of litigation functioning as regulation is a violation of 
existing law.”118  When properly viewed as part of the policymaking 
lifecycle, law enforcement by municipalities is a natural — and 
essential — part of the democratic process. 
 
 115. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 116. See supra note 15. 
 117. Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1270 (2018). 
 118. Id. at 1270–71. 
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Under the second function, taking action to protect members of a 
local community is consistent with a city’s representational 
function.119  As compared to other plaintiffs, cities have a strong basis 
from which to pursue affirmative litigation and are able to vindicate 
the public interest in a way that private plaintiffs cannot.120  As the 
closest representatives of their constituencies, city governments are 
also often in the best position to understand the needs of their 
communities.  City offices may be more likely to take up issues 
important to their residents than representatives at higher levels of 
government.121  In addition, because city officials represent a 
different slice of the electorate than a state or federal official, their 
view of constituents’ priorities and needs may vary dramatically from 
the conclusions of officials at other levels of government.122  Thus, a 
diversified set of enforcers leads to a diversified set of enforcement 
priorities.  For example, a large, densely-populated city in an 
otherwise rural state may have strong reasons to prioritize housing 
code violations due to the public health and economic implications of 
housing noncompliance for the city.  By contrast, state enforcers 
might focus on farm workers’ rights or other issues impacting 
statewide populations.  Neither set of priorities is more or less 
legitimate; both represent the interests of the constituents served by 
their respective representatives. 
City affirmative litigation can also support municipalities from a 
fiscal perspective.  It will allow them to recoup their own costs as well 
as recover money for their communities through penalties assessed 
for illegal behavior or through actions aimed at recovering funds that 
were illegally withheld from the city or its residents.123  These actions 
 
 119. “Attorneys general may not be driven by the pursuit of attorney’s fees, but 
their status as political representatives means that they must balance the interests of 
the public at large with those of the individuals they purport to represent in an 
adjudicative capacity.” Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: 
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 487 (2012). 
 120. Swan, supra note 117, at 1244 (observing that, in tobacco litigation, “changing 
the plaintiff changed how the harm was understood. Rather than being understood as 
the result of individual choices for which individuals should bear the cost, plaintiff 
city claims are reframed as harms to the public, which are the result of third-party 
wrongdoing, and for which, accordingly, those third-party wrongdoers should bear 
the cost”). 
 121. See Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 59, 86 (2014) (arguing for associational standing for cities and suggesting that 
cities may take a stronger interest in local problems – and be able to achieve 
consensus on those issues more readily – than state level enforcers). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, City of San Francisco v. Nevada, 2013 WL 5290245 
(Cal. Super. 2013) (No. CGC-13-534108); Complaint at 1, City of New York v. FedEx 
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can take the form of lawsuits that put money back in the pockets of 
those who fell victim to predatory practices and penalize the bad 
actor,124 or money being returned to city coffers.125  In both 
situations, cities are able to vindicate the monetary interests of their 
communities that have been harmed by illegal behavior.  In this way, 
cities see a return on investment for their affirmative litigation efforts 
that would not exist if enforcement was left to state and federal 
players. 
 
Ground Package Sys. Inc., 2013 WL 6845792 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 9173); 
Press Release, N.Y. City Law Dep’t, City Announces Settlement with FedEx Ground 
over Cigarette Deliveries (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/Fed-Ex%20Cigarette%20Settlement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2CW-DYGW]. 
 124. For example, in 2007, San Francisco sued Check ‘n Go and Money Mart for 
making payday loans with annual percentage rates over 400, more than eleven times 
the allowable interest rate in California. Press Release, Office of the City Attorney of 
S.F., Herreras Payday Lender Case Nets 7.7 Million for Borrowers at Zero Expense 
to Taxpayers (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2013/08/05/herreras-
payday-lender-case-nets-7-7-million-for-borrowers-at-zero-expense-to-taxpayers/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DAZ-59FR].  The settlement ultimately reached in this matter 
resulted in $7.7 million in restitution for harmed consumers. Id.  In 2016, Los Angeles 
settled a case with Wells Fargo bank related to the bank’s opening of accounts 
without consumers’ consent or knowledge, causing consumers to incur unwanted fees 
and other negative financial consequences.  L.A. obtained a $50 million civil penalty, 
which the city indicated would be devoted to future consumer protection. Press 
Release, L.A. City Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer 
Achieves Historic Result in Consumer Action Against Wells Fargo; Bank to Make 
Restitution to Customers, Pay $50-million in Penalties; Unprecedented Coordination 
with Federal Regulators to Benefit Consumers Nationwide (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.lacityattorney.org/single-post/2016/09/08/Los-Angeles-City-Attorney-
Mike-Feuer-Achieves-Historic-Result-in-Consumer-Action-Against-Wells-Fargo-
Bank-to-Make-Restitution-to-Customers-Pay-50-million-in-Penalties-
Unprecedented-Coordination-with-Federal-Regulators-to-Benefit-Consumers-
Nationwide [https://perma.cc/444U-3RJR]. 
 125. For example, New York City has actively enforced tobacco and cigarette tax 
laws in response to tobacco companies refusing to pay the city millions of dollars in 
tax revenues that would have gone to city services and other vital expenses.  Using 
affirmative litigation, the city responded on several fronts.  It filed a complaint stating 
that FedEx “knowingly” transported, possessed, and distributed contraband 
cigarettes and committed “racketeering acts” under the RICO statute.  Complaint at 
1, City of New York v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 2013 WL 6845792 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (No. 13 CV 9173).  In 2013, FedEx agreed to pay $2.4 million to resolve part of 
the city’s claim for delivering untaxed cigarettes. Press Release, N.Y. City Law Dep’t, 
N.Y. City Announces Settlement with FedEx Ground Over Cigarette Deliveries 
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/Fed-
Ex%20Cigarette%20Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2CW-DYGW]. 
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2. The Role of Cities in Advancing Social Progress 
Cities can also be instruments of social progress, both through their 
ability to instigate and lead national conversations on progressive 
issues126 and their ability to resist national trends that do not align 
with their communities’ vision of justice.127  These abilities are unique 
to cities because their origin is the will of the populace at the local 
level and further highlight the value of cities working in parallel to 
other enforcers in a diversified system of public rights enforcement. 
Just like states, cities should serve as laboratories of democracy.128  
Affirmative litigation provides cities with one tool to both advance 
issues important to their local communities and simultaneously 
exercise national leadership on an issue by pushing its unique 
perspective into the national consciousness and conversation.129  The 
San Francisco City Attorney’s efforts to fight for marriage equality 
through the first government-initiated challenge to marriage laws that 
discriminate against same-sex couples illustrate the influence a city 
can have in both protecting the civil rights of its residents and in 
contributing to the national dialogue, influencing the law’s 
development on a national scale.130  In its motion for intervention, 
San Francisco articulated its unique interest in protecting the rights of 
its residents and the unique harms it experienced as a city from the 
 
 126. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 
(2005) (discussing San Francisco’s decision to challenge prevailing norms by marrying 
gay and lesbian couples). 
 127. Cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1265–72 (2009). 
 128. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the 
power to prevent an experiment.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, More Cities Suit Up for Legal Actions, WALL ST. J.  
(May 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-cities-suit-up-for-legal-actions-
1462218870 [https://perma.cc/59XR-957J]; Affirmative Litigation, CITY ATT’Y OF S.F., 
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/aboutus/teams/affirmative-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/2N6E-VFRS]. See generally Affirmative Litigation, PROVIDENCE 
CITY SOLICITOR, http://www.providenceri.gov/law-department/affirmative-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CR2-ZZRA]. 
 130. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Press Release, Office 
of the City Att’y of S.F, San Francisco’s Legal Fight for Marriage Equality (Feb. 12, 
2004), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2004/02/12/san-franciscos-legal-fight-for-
marriage-equality/ [https://perma.cc/7BPJ-24GT]; Scott L. Cummings & Douglas 
NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1282–83 (2010). 
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denial of those rights.131  San Francisco argued that, as the local 
government entity responsible for enforcing California’s 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages against its 
LGBT citizens, it had a significant and unique interest in the 
action.132  Specifically, the city articulated “not only a financial 
interest in licensing and performing marriages of same-sex couples 
and in the tax revenues that flow from weddings held in the City, but 
also . . . an interest in preventing social, mental health, and other 
harms suffered by its LGBT citizens.”133 
Cities can also stake out a position adverse to that adopted by the 
federal or state government in a way that gives voice to the will of 
their constituencies.134  City affirmative litigation has been a 
significant tool in the “resistance” movement against actions — and 
inactions — of the current administration for exactly this reason.135  
Cities have articulated and advocated in court for positions that 
represent their residents and are at odds with state or national 
policy.136  Sanctuary city policies and the recent litigation surrounding 
them is an example of this dynamic in play.137  Cities have argued that 
their duties to protect public safety require them to build 
relationships of trust with local communities, and that federal 
 
 131. See Press Release, City Att’y Dennis Herrera, S.F. Moves to Intervene in 
Federal Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009), 
https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/PROP8-USDIST-
INTERVENTION.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UZ-HP2B]; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 
F. Supp. 2d 921, 926, 928–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1065–66 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 132. Press Release, City Att’y Dennis Herrera, S.F. Moves to Intervene in Federal 
Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/PROP8-USDIST-INTERVENTION.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PH9E-QAG2]. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 
(2005). 
 135. See generally Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 
3d 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-02921) (involving cities of New York, San 
Francisco, Chicago, Providence, Philadelphia, and Seattle). Complaint, City & 
County of San Francisco v. Sessions, No. 3:17-cv-04642 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 11, 
2017). 
 136. See supra note 135; Press Release, City Attorney of S.F., Herrera moves to 
invalidate Department of Justice grant conditions targeting sanctuary cities (July 12, 
2018), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2018/07/12/herrera-moves-to-invalidate-
department-of-justice-grant-conditions-targeting-sanctuary-cities 
[https://perma.cc/8JAA-H6BV]. 
 137. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 175 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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immigration enforcement by local officials undermines the safety of 
all residents, regardless of their citizenship or documentation.138 
Taken together, cities can effectuate the will of their constituents 
both as a reaction against other levels of government and as a 
proactive means of leading an issue that does not yet have a 
champion.  In both cases, cities can act legitimately as representatives 
of their communities, vindicating the rights and interests of their 
residents that have either been ignored or attacked by other officials.  
Just as local legislation and executive decision-making can be 
legitimate exercises in cooperative or uncooperative federalism, so 
too is affirmative litigation and enforcement by cities an extension of 
those representational roles.139 
In this way, local enforcement activity can be both a safety valve — 
a redundant feature that guards against a single point of failure at 
another level of government — and a diversification feature — a 
unique opportunity for new and different actions than might 
otherwise be pursued at the state or federal levels.  Unlike the 
example of the hospital back-up generator, there is no single designer 
responsible for the design flaw we have identified in our current 
system.  From federal and state policymakers enacting legislation that 
limits the authorities of local law enforcement, to federal courts 
progressively circumscribing the role of private plaintiffs, to city 
 
 138. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Cty. of Santa Clara et al. in Support of the 
City of Philadelphia’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, City of Philadelphia v. 
Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-03894-MMB) (“In 
exercising its discretion over local law enforcement policy, Philadelphia has made the 
considered judgment that devoting local resources to immigration enforcement 
would be detrimental to community safety. Philadelphia is not alone in this judgment. 
More than 600 counties and numerous cities — including many of the amici — have 
opted to limit their engagement in federal immigration enforcement efforts.”) 
(internal citations omitted)); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-cv-05720) (“The 2012 
[Welcoming City Ordinance] reaffirmed that removing barriers to ‘the cooperation of 
all persons, both documented citizens and those without documentation status,’ with 
law enforcement was ‘essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public 
order, safety, and security in the entire City.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 139. We acknowledge that cities have the ability to use these tools to advance all 
types of policies, not just those of a progressive minority.  That is, after all, the nature 
of a representative democracy.  We believe the interests of our communities will be 
best served, however, if enforcers at multiple levels of government are considering 
the rights of their communities.  The more enforcers on the scene, the fewer points of 
failure will exist overall.  Moreover, each government office is limited in its actions by 
the constitution and by federal, state, and local law.  So, our recommendation for 
redundancy and diversification should insulate our communities from extreme 
electoral shifts at any one level of government even while shifts will inevitably 
happen in varying degrees over time. 
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officials having to make hard choices about whether to expend 
resources of affirmative work, the causes are complex and varied.  As 
a result, some cities may encounter barriers to pursuing affirmative 
litigation, including new state preemption laws and longstanding 
jurisprudence limiting the power of cities.  A full realization of city 
power would require significant changes throughout our legal and 
political system.  Notwithstanding these obstacles, cities have the 
power to act now, using the powers already available to them and 
within the existing legal framework.  They can provide redundancy 
and diversification of rights enforcement immediately, by using their 
existing tools and authorities. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a discussion of design flaws and avoidance 
of single points of failure.  Like the hospital dealing with downed 
generators during a major hurricane, our democratic process suffers 
from a design flaw when it comes to enforcement of our laws.  The 
laws on the books to protect our communities are insufficiently 
enforced due to a confluence of factors: The current federal 
administration has pulled back on its enforcement of key public rights 
against a backdrop of already insufficient enforcement; the law 
related to class-action lawsuits has been increasingly constricted; the 
courts have increasingly accepted mandatory arbitration clauses; and 
the class-action waivers frequently found in mandatory arbitration 
clauses have limited the ability of individual plaintiffs to vindicate 
their own rights without a government champion.  Our system is not 
currently designed to protect our communities’ public rights when 
two of its key protectors – the federal government and private 
plaintiffs – are handicapped. 
The result of this design flaw is two-fold: from a functional 
perspective, it means that people experience real-life harm that goes 
unaddressed; from a theoretical perspective, it undermines the 
legitimacy of our democratic institutions when society’s laws lack 
real-life protective effect.  This Article advocated for a system with 
built-in redundancy and diversification by design, in which every level 
of government is ready and able to enforce our core rights and 
freedoms.  Affirmative litigation by cities — in addition to 
engagement by states — is a critical component of this framework.  
Cities should have the ability to be enforcers and protectors of their 
communities by investigating legal violations and filing lawsuits.  
Increasing affirmative litigation by cities is an important solution to 
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the democratic design flaw that will help us move toward a more 
effective system of ensuring our laws translate to reality. 
